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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
________________ 
 
No. 15-3210 
________________ 
 
In re: GORDON ALLEN WASHINGTON 
 
GORDON ALLEN WASHINGTON, 
         Appellant 
  
v. 
  
BANK OF NEW YORK MELLON, 
As Trustee for the Certificate-Holders of the CWABS, Inc., 
Asset-Backed Certificates, Series 2007-5 
 
     ________________ 
 
Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of New Jersey 
(D.C. Civil Action No. 2-14-cv-08063) 
District Judge: Honorable Susan D. Wigenton 
________________ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
September 26, 2016 
 
Before: AMBRO, SMITH, and FISHER, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: September 30, 2016) 
________________ 
 
OPINION* 
________________ 
 
                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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AMBRO, Circuit Judge 
 
 Gordon Washington has declared bankruptcy and wants to sell his house in 
Madison, New Jersey. Though he is in default on his mortgage, he argues that he can sell 
the property free and clear of the lien his creditors have on the house because they have 
run out of time to foreclose. The Bankruptcy Court granted Washington summary 
judgment because it agreed that New Jersey’s foreclosure statute of limitations had run. 
On appeal, the District Court read the statute differently and determined that there was 
still time left on the clock. We agree with the District Court’s interpretation and therefore 
affirm.1 
 Washington purchased the house in February 2007 and signed a mortgage and a 
promissory note. Though the maturity date on the note is listed as March 1, 2037, the 
mortgage gave the creditors the right to require accelerated payment if Washington 
breached the agreement. A few months after buying the property, Washington stopped 
making payments. A mortgage document with an effective date of November 2007 
reflects that the full amount of the loan was then “due and owing.” Joint Appendix (“JA”) 
10–11. Washington considers this to be an invocation of the acceleration clause.  
 Meanwhile, the creditors filed a foreclosure complaint in December 2007. It stated 
that the “whole unpaid principal sum” on the house “shall be now due.” JA 11–12. 
                                              
1 The Bankruptcy Court and District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 157, 
158(a), and 1334.We have jurisdiction per 28 U.S.C. §§ 158(d) and 1291. “Because the 
District Court sat below as an appellate court, this Court conducts the same review of the 
Bankruptcy Court’s order as did the District Court.” In re Telegroup, Inc., 281 F.3d 133, 
136 (3d Cir. 2002). We review the grant of summary judgment de novo. Pa. Coal Ass’n 
v. Babbitt, 63 F.3d 231, 236 (3d Cir. 1995). 
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However, in 2013 a New Jersey state court dismissed the foreclosure action without 
prejudice based on the creditors’ failure to prosecute. Washington filed for bankruptcy 
the following year. In connection with those proceedings, he argued that the creditors no 
longer had an interest in the house because they had run out of time under New Jersey 
law to foreclose.  
 New Jersey’s statute of limitations for foreclosures provides: 
An action to foreclose a residential mortgage shall not be commenced 
following the earliest of: 
 
a. Six years from the date fixed for the making of the last payment or the 
maturity date set forth in the mortgage or the note, bond, or other obligation 
secured by the mortgage, whether the date is itself set forth or may be 
calculated from information contained in the mortgage or note, bond, or 
other obligation, except that if the date fixed for the making of the last 
payment or the maturity date has been extended by a written instrument, the 
action to foreclose shall not be commenced after six years from the 
extended date under the terms of the written instrument; 
 
b. Thirty-six years from the date of recording of the mortgage, or, if the 
mortgage is not recorded, 36 years from the date of execution, so long as 
the mortgage itself does not provide for a period of repayment in excess of 
30 years; or 
 
c. Twenty years from the date on which the debtor defaulted, which default 
has not been cured, as to any of the obligations or covenants contained in 
the mortgage or in the note, bond, or other obligation secured by the 
mortgage, except that if the date to perform any of the obligations or 
covenants has been extended by a written instrument or payment on 
account has been made, the action to foreclose shall not be commenced 
after 20 years from the date on which the default or payment on account 
thereof occurred under the terms of the written instrument. 
 
N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:50-56.1.  
 
 This case is about the relationship between subsections “a” and “c” of the statute. 
Washington argues that the creditors, by demanding full payment, accelerated the note’s 
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maturity date from March 2037 to June 2007 (the date of his default). He therefore 
contends that, per subsection “a,” the creditors had six years from the new maturity date 
to foreclose, meaning they ran out of time in June 2013. He uses the November 2007 
mortgage document and the December 2007 foreclosure filing as evidence of this 
purported acceleration. The creditors respond that subsection “c” governs instead and that 
they have until 2027 (20 years after the default) to foreclose. The Bankruptcy Court 
agreed with Washington and held that the limitations period had run by the time he filed 
for bankruptcy in 2014. The District Court, by contrast, ruled that subsection “c” is the 
operative provision and that the creditors still have time left in the 20-year period.  
 In interpreting a statute, we begin with its text. See Barnhart v. Sigmon Coal Co., 
534 U.S. 438, 450 (2002). Subsection “a” tells us to start with the “maturity date set forth 
in the mortgage or the note.” It contemplates that this date can be “extended by a written 
instrument” but says nothing of the possibility that it can be shortened by a demand for 
full payment. The note that Washington signed has a maturity date of 2037. And no 
writing alters that date. By contrast, the wording of subsection “c,” which contemplates a 
default followed by foreclosure, fits comfortably with our facts. Thus, the plain terms of 
the statute support the creditors’ argument. 
 Additionally, it is a “cardinal principle of statutory construction” to “give effect, if 
possible, to every clause and word of a statute.” Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 173 
(1997) (internal quotation marks omitted). Under Washington’s interpretation of the 
statute, however, subsection “c” effectively becomes a nullity. Indeed, Washington tries 
to use the very act of foreclosure as evidence that the six-year period from subsection “a” 
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had started running. But it cannot be that merely filing for foreclosure takes subsection 
“c” off the table. Otherwise, given that all § 2A:50-56.1 actions involve foreclosure—it 
is, after all, a foreclosure statute of limitations—the 20-year period from subsection “c” 
would never be used.  
*     *     *     *     * 
 Because Washington’s reading fails to follow the plain text of the statute and 
renders a portion of it superfluous, we reject it. Like the District Court, we conclude that 
subsection “c” governs and that the creditors still have time to bring a foreclosure action. 
Washington also presented the Bankruptcy Court with other arguments apart from the 
statute of limitations, but we decline to reach them in the first instance.  
